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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION-APPEAL
BY "PERSON AGGRIEVED"--EcoNoMIC INJURY-[United States].-The Tele-
graph Herald applied to the Federal Communications Commission for a
permit to construct a broadcasting station in Dubuque, Iowa. The Sanders
Brothers Radio Station, located near Dubuque, intervened to oppose issu-
ance of the permit, contending that it would be financially injured by the
proposed new station.' The Commission granted the construction permit,
but was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on
the ground that the Commission had failed to consider the alleged economic
injury to the Sanders Brothers Station.2 Held, that the Commission need
not consider the possibility of economic injury to existing stations before
issuing a permit for the construction of a new radio station, so long as the
injury alleged would not affect the "public interest, convenience, or neces-
sity"; but that an intervenor alleging economic injury may appeal from
the Commission's order as a "person aggrieved." Federal Communications
Comm. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station.3
The Federal Communications Act provides for appeal by applicants
refused licenses to build or operate radio stations, by any other person
aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of the
Commission in granting or refusing such licenses, and by any radio operator
whose license has been suspended by the Commission.4 The instant case is
the first to determine that the term "person aggrieved" comprehends one
who may be economically injured by the issuance of a license. Dicta in
prior cases, however, are in accord.5
The Commission contended that absence of the respondent's right to
have the Commission consider the issue of economic injury per se, implies
absence of any right of appeal as a person economically aggrieved. In an-
swer, the Court reasoned that this view would deprive the provision for
appeal by a "person aggrieved" of any substantial effect; that this section
of the Act must mean something; and that, therefore, Congress may have
intended that persons economically injured should be allowed to appeal
because of the public interest in securing licensing orders free from "errors
of law."6 The Court did not consider expressly the Commission's contention
that the provision was purely remedial-that Congress intended merely to
1. Intervention was permitted under the rules of procedure of the Com-
mission. Code of Fed. Regs. (1939) tit. 47, sec. 1.151.
2. Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. Federal Communications Comm. (1939)
106 F. (2d) 321.
3. (1940) 309 U. S. 470.
4. (1934) 48 Stat. 1093, c. 652, sec. 402 (b), 47 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1939)
sec. 402 (b) (2).
5. See: Great Western Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Communications
Comm. (1937) 94 F. (2d) 244; Pulitzer Publ. Co. v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm. (1937) 94 F. (2d) 249; Pittsburgh Radio Supply House v.
Federal Communications Comm. (1938) 98 F. (2d) 303.
6. Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. Federal Communications Comm. (1940)
309 U. S. 470, 477. The Court also said there: "We hold, therefore, that
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provide for those whose legal interests had been affected a more expeditious
method for obtaining judicial review of the Commission's exercise of dis-
cretion than the bringing of a separate equitable action in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction.7 Had the Court adopted this view, the provision would
not have been "deprived of any substantial effect." However, there is little
basis for the Commission's contention.8
The federal courts do not have the power to render advisory opinions;
-their jurisdiction is confined to justiciable disputes, i. e., disputes involv-
ing legal interests.9 While it is true that there is no limitation on what the
courts may decide is an interest sufficient to make a case or controversy,
the instant case marks an extension of previous doctrine with regard to
justiciable interest in respect of property. Mere financial injury does not
confer a standing in court; if there has been no violation of a "legal
right," there is simply damnum absque injuria.1o If, on the other hand,
financial injury results from the violation of a property interest protected
by law, there is a justiciable dispute.' 1 Yet, after deciding in the first part
of its opinion that the Federal Communications Act conferred upon re-
spondent no property right, the Court went on to allow the appeal. It is
also note-worthy that the very case' 2 cited by the Supreme Court as prece-
the respondent had the requisite standing to appeal and to raise, in the
court below, any relevant question of law in respect of the order of the
Commission." Quaere, whether "any relevant question of law" includes
constitutional, statutory, and procedural questions raised by the conduct of
the Commission affecting only the rights of persons other than an appellant
under sec. 402 (b) (2).
7. The Commission cited the following cases in support of its contention:
United States v. Merchants & Manufacturers Traffic Ass'n (1916) 242 U. S.
178; Edward Hines Trustees v. United States (1923) 263 U. S. 143; Sprunt
& Son v. United States (1930) 281 U. S. 249. These cases involved suits to
enjoin orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and were brought
under the authority of the Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, c. 309, 28
U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 41(28), as amended by the Urgent Deficiencies Act
(1913) 38 Stat. 208, c. 32, 28 U. S. C. A. (1927) sec. 41 (28).
8. Provisions for direct judicial review of administrative orders are as
common as provisions for equitable actions to set aside such orders. See
McAllister, Statutory Roads to Review of Federal Administrative Orders
(1940) 28 Calif. L. Rev. 129.
9. Muskrat v. United States (1910) 219 U. S. 346. See Coleman v.
Miller (1938) 307 U. S. 433, 441: "The principle that the applicant must
show a legal interest in the controversy has been maintained."
10. "'Want of right and want of remedy are justly said to be reciprocal.
* * where, although there is damage, there is no violation of a right no
action can be maintained.'" Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes (1937) 302 U. S.
464, 479. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman (1881) 105 U. S. 166; Tennessee Elec-
tric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1938) 306 U. S. 118. See
Coleman v. Miller (1939) 307 U. S. 433.
11. Frost v. Corporation Comm. (1928) 278 U. S. 515.
12. Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Oregon-Washington R. R. (1932) 288
U. S. 14. This case held that, in a suit to set aside an order of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, commissions of interested states are entitled
as "aggrieved parties" (under the Urgent Deficiencies Act) to appeal to
the Supreme Court, even though the United States will not join in the
appeal.
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dent for allowing the appeal in the instant case was, in a later case,13 used
to illustrate the proposition that the Court recognizes as a legal interest
"the legitimate interest of public officials and administrative commissions,
federal and state, to resist the endeavor to prevent the enforcement of
statutes in relation to which they have official duties."' 4 Yet, in the instant
case, respondent was not an official charged with the enforcement of any
law; it was merely a private person who might suffer financial injury.
The real basis for the Court's holding, and the real significance of this
extension of the doctrine of legal interest, is probably to be found in that
portion of the original opinion deleted by the Court when it denied the
Commission a rehearing: 15 "In this view, while the injury to such person
would not be the subject of redress, the person might be the instrument,
upon an appeal, of redressing an injury to the public service which would
otherwise remain without remedy." 16 This novel basis for allowing an
appeal from an administrative agency when the term "person aggrieved"
is used in the governing statute may prove to be of great importance. Other
statutes contain the term and future legislation may incorporate it.27
T. B.
AGENCY-SCOPE or EMPLOYMENT-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR NEGLI-
GENCE OF AGENT COMMANDEERED BY PoLICF--[District of Columbia].-The
driver of defendant's truck was commandeered by a policeman to chase a
traffic violator, and, while driving under the officer's direction, negligently
injured plaintiff. Held, one judge dissenting, that the principal was not
liable for its agent's negligence, since the agent was acting outside the scope
of his employment. Balinovic v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.j
The case is interesting as an expression of two different philosophies,
both somewhat obscured by the legal verbiage "scope of employment." This
term stands for a legal concept which is stretched, on occasion, to cover
situations in which the court, for reasons of policy, feels that the principal
should bear the loss.' Thus, the principal has been held liable in numerous
13. Coleman v. Miller (1938) 307 U. S. 433.
14. Id. at 442.
15. See 8 U. S. L. Week (1940) 668 (rehearing denied and opinion
amended).
16. Federal Communications Comm. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station
(1940) 60 S. Ct. 693, 698 (italics supplied).
17. E. g.: Bituminous Coal Act (1937) 50 Stat. 85, c. 127, sec. 6 (b),
15 U. S. C. A. (1939) sec. 836 (b) ; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52
Stat. 1065, sec. 10 (a), 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1939) sec. 210.
1. (App. D. C. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 505.
2. See Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. (1929) 278 U. S. 349,
356, where the court stated: "But few doctrines of the law are more firmly
established or more in harmony with notions of social policy than that of
the liability of the principal without fault of his own." In Robards v.
Bannon Sewer Pipe Co. (1908) 130 Ky. 380, 387, 113 S. W. 429, 18 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 923, 132 Am. St. Rep. 394, the court said that the law will not
"undertake to make any nice distinctions, fixing with precision the line
that separates the act of the servant from the act of the individual. When
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